Because of time constraints due to the mutual desire of the editors and myself finally to publish the previous paper, I was not able to consider carefully all the remaining reservations expressed by the reviewers. However, there are several topics on which I felt additional comments might be useful. I will divide my comments into the following areas: primary instigation and deviation instigation, expression characteristics, molar and response-pattern levels of analysis, and reinforcement theory.
PRIMARY AND DEVIATION INSTIGATION There remains an important confusion about response instigation that should be addressed here. Two types of instigation are present in most contingency sessions; I will call them primary instigation and deviation instigation. Primary instigation determines the expression of behavior patterns in free baseline and represents the effects of physiological states and external stimuli on behavior. It is primary instigation that is held constant through the procedures of fixing the time of day, the deprivation regime, and the physical circumstances of the apparatus. Deviation instigation is produced when a schedule linkage constrains the expression of the primary instigation for an activity. Because of the schedule linkage, the deviation instigation produced by unexpressed (or overexpressed) primary instigation for one response is typically expressed through the other response. It is the resul- tant "balancing" of expression of the deviation instigation for the instrumental and contingent responses that determines the changes from baseline expression under the contingency. Thus, in the present view a schedule has a dual role. In conjunction with the primary instigation it establishes the conditions for changes in behavior, and it provides the linkage for the expression of those conditions in behavior.
Most researchers in operant psychology (including Premack, 1959 Premack, , 1965 , in his early phase) appear to have confused something akin to primary instigation with deviation instigation. For most, the reinforcing ability of a particular event (response) is determined by some quality of that event, equivalent here to some aspect of primary instigation. However, this view is not correct. The critical determinant of response change under a schedule is the deviation instigation. To be sure if the same schedule is always used, differences in deviation instigation will be determined exclusively by differences in primary instigation. This is why Premack's (1959 Premack's ( , 1965 probability-differential hypothesis appears to work, and why lawful drive effects can be shown in operant conditioning. However, if schedules differ, the deviation instigation cannot be predicted from primary instigation alone, and the probability-differential hypothesis fails to predict differences in the effects of various schedules.
One of the most startling illustrations of the distinction between primary and deviation instigation is provided by schedules that produce no deviation instigation because the ratio of instrumental to contingent responding specified by the schedule is the same as their ratio in baseline. Thus, repeated juxtapositions of, say, wheel running and drinking produce no increase in baseline responding despite the fact that considerable 383 primary instigation exists and is expressed (Premack, 1965; Timberlake, 1980 Powers, 1978; Sibly & McFarland, 1974 ). Such a model should clarify the organization of multiple effects of constraints imposed at different levels, and the relative importance of each characteristic.
In contrast to other reviewers, Mazur was willing to accept the logic of responsepattern set-points, but not that of molar setpoints. From the application of controltheory models to other biological phenomena, I expect both levels of control to be present in learned performance. That Mazur (1982) (Rachlin, 1982) and that of conceptualizing the organization of behavior (e.g., Gallistel, 1980) . Recent evidence suggests that allocation of responding is insensitive to alternatives separated in time by an hour or more (Timberlake, 1984) , a finding that has considerable ramifications for the distinction between open and closed economies (Hursh, 1978 (Timberlake, 1983c (Moore & Stuttard, 1979; Timberlake, 1983a ). Attempting to eliminate or hold constant other determinants of behavior to focus on responsereinforcer conjunctions is not the answer. I think the time has come to follow the Brelands ' (1961, 1966) lead in considering at least a portion of the botanical jungles of response organization, regulation, and stimulus sensitivities (Gallistel, 1980; Timberlake, 1983b) .
It is not that reinforcement theory is wrong-just that it is incomplete and overextended. Principles of reinforcement can be used to control behavior, but they work in part because we ask the animal to do things for which it was designed, and in circumstances created to encourage it. In my laboratory we have a law termed variously Timberlake's second law, or the Law of the Operant Chamber. According to this law, modifications of standard operant chambers and procedures nearly always decrease their efficiency in producing learned behavior. The point is that operant apparatus and procedures were developed and refined by inventive, careful, and sensitive people. Thus, instead of being arbitrary, the apparatus and procedures have been shaped around the animal and its behavior. Discovering the reasons for the success of these designs will be an important step in discovering the nature of the organism and the role of learning in its ecology and evolution.
The behavior-regulation approach should serve some function in these tasks. It calls attention to a different set of causal agents and sets a larger framework for learning than does the reinforcement approach. The behavior-regulation approach was developed to model the determinants of asymptotic responding, not the acquisition of responses. Thus, it identifies reinforcing circumstances a priori and readily predicts outcomes that contradict the transituational law of effect (Meehl, 1950) . Unfortunately, despite the theoretical and empirical importance of this capability, it is rarely discussed in texts on learning or behavior modification.
Further, in the form of several mathematical models the behavior-regulation approach accurately predicts instrumental performance on simple schedules and in choice situations. It invites consideration of aspects of responding not adequately dealt with, such as the time period over which the distribution of responding is integrated, the role of the instrumental response, the response-constraining aspects of the contingency, and the levels of organization of responding. Although far from perfect, the behavior-regulation approach for the present is an heuristic way of organizing the phenomena of learned performance. Several of the reviewers of this paper use at least com-ponents of the approach in their own work.
Finally, I would like to thank the reviewers of the several versions of the previous paper for their time and comments. I especially thank the "non-expert" reviewers in this area of theorizing (Case, Shull, and Branch) 
